{"id":"asset_d8c539d829b6","source_id":"c124fd8b-5812-4cff-a0ae-56f8156bd735","origin":"dropbox","type":"text/markdown","category":"text","name":"03-dotcom-2000.md","path":"/03-dotcom-2000.md","size_bytes":3607,"title":"03 dotcom 2000","description":"This analysis traces the dot-com crash from the Nasdaq peak in 2000 through the recovery period, examining whether the Federal Reserve's aggressive rate cuts successfully contained the damage or instead redirected capital into new asset bubbles. It addresses the question of whether bubble policy should focus on prevention or post-bubble cleanup, and evaluates the accountability mechanisms and long-term consequences of that approach.","extracted_text":"# We Cured the Bubble With Another One: The Dot-Com Bust, 2000–2002\n\nThe Nasdaq peaked at 5,048 on 10 March 2000 and reached 1,114 in October 2002 —\na fall of 78 per cent. Around $5 trillion of market value disappeared. Companies\nthat had gone public without revenue, let alone profit, went to zero in numbers\nthat made the whole episode look, in retrospect, less like a market than a\ncollective hallucination with a settlement system attached.\n\nThe mechanics are well understood. A genuine technological transformation was\nunder way, and the market's error was not in believing the internet mattered — it\ndid — but in believing that mattering would accrue to the firms then listed, in\nproportion to their spending. Valuation methods were invented to justify prices\nthat conventional methods could not: eyeballs, page views, revenue multiples\napplied to companies with no plausible route to margin. Investment banks earned\nfees taking these companies public and employed analysts who rated them buy w","attributes":{"dropbox_file_id":"id:1EL26tM-qg4AAAAAAAAACw"},"usable_for":["research reference","content source","writing style reference","fact extraction"],"price_sats":{"card":0,"full":1100},"content_available":true,"available":true,"addedAt":1787789249949}